Abstracts – Remembrance Cultures

**Ludger Derenthal:** Dada, die Toten und die Überlebenden des Ersten Weltkriegs, in zeitenblicke 3 (2004), Nr. 1.

It is well known that the experiences and encounters made in the First World War were decisive for the emergence of Dadaism. To illustrate the assaults on the foundation of the very civilisation which had caused the war the Dadaists made use of the old traditional settings and backgrounds in their collages and montage processes, but only to abolish and abhor these even more radically. This article deals with whether, apart from their protest, the Dadaists also picked up the remembrance of the war victims as a central theme in their work. Is it conceivable that, along with the caustic criticism and defamation of the bourgeois society, they also intended some kind of dolorous remembrance of the dead? Certainly they were seeking a mourning different to what they regarded as a false pious ceremony of the ruling classes. Some of the most scandalous and publicly outrageous exhibits and actions from Dada Berlin, Cologne and Paris were selected for this study.

**Andreas Fickers:** Gedächtnisopfer - Erinnern und Vergessen in der Vergangenheitspolitik der deutschsprachigen Belgier, in zeitenblicke 3 (2004), Nr. 1.

The objective of the essay is to analyse how the East Belgians deal with their history in the 20th century, taking the First and Second World War as an example. Here it would appear that the public remembrance discourse was characterised by two models which could be described as a decreed and a self-imposed silence about certain historical events. Whereas the first half of the century was dominated by forms of decreed silence - or political structures which formed the remembrance framework for politics of the past in the sense of nationalist historical interests -, the time after the Second World War is characterised by forms of self-imposed silence or by politics of the past whose main aim was the stylisation of the East Belgians as 'victims' of their history for purposes of forced assimilation efforts. While during the time between the wars historical events were reinterpreted so that they fitted into the respective politicised picture ('Cantons rédimés'), the postwar years drew a veil of taboo over the national-socialist past in particular, in order to be able to dispose of this encumbrance and at long last to "think, feel and act Belgian". In both cases not only was history the 'victim' of divergent interests in the politics of the past, but also the ability to genuinely remember.

**Christian Fuhrmeister:** Ein Märtyrer auf der Zugspitze? Glühbirnenkreuze, Bildpropaganda und andere Medialisierungen des Totenkults um Albert Leo Schlageter in der Weimarer Republik und im Nationalsozialismus, in zeitenblicke 3 (2004), Nr. 1.

This paper compares the main features of the death cult surrounding Albert Leo Schlageter in the Weimar Republic and in National Socialism. The focus here is the use of media, which distinguishes the national socialist martyr cult from the remembrance of the dead during the Weimar Republic. The various levels of medialisation are ultimately demonstrated in a concrete case study, the Schlageter memorial on the Zugspitze.

**Rüdiger Hachtmann:** Die Revolution von 1848 – Kulte um die Toten und die Lebenden, in zeitenblicke 3 (2004), Nr. 1.

This article pursues the genesis of the death cult of 1848/49 and the cult surrounding living revolutionary heroes, as well as the forms, metamorphoses and function of the remembrance cultures based on these. In Germany the revolutionary death cult was not suited to becoming
a national myth that would unify various social groups and political movements. The public commemoration of fallen revolutionaries had, unlike in other European countries, such as Hungary or Italy, a more lasting dividing effect on the nation in Germany. The pathetic-solemn remembrance of the various people who had fallen in the 1848/49 revolution and the implied political mission of these was what gave the parties - in any case in Germany - some contour whatsoever. Both the emerging left and right-wing sympathisers saw themselves as the executor of the alleged political will of the revolutionaries who had fallen in battle or, depending on the political view, their adversaries who had been killed in battle "for King and country".

To begin with, the death cult became a political code for both sides; for the left it marked the start of a kind of revolutionary family tradition. The death cult, whatever political direction, implied inclusion - and also exclusion: now that the death cult had become a political code another element was included - the political and social opponent was implemented as the concept of the enemy. Collective ostracism allowed the mostly complex historical-political conflict constellations to be faded out or at least reduced to a simple and personalised basic pattern. Second, although it had become a "party affair", the death cult around the street fighters who fell on 18th March 1848 in Berlin, celebrated by a sometimes small, sometimes larger minority was always latently present in the entire national memory. Third, the death cults and the political functionalisation of burials were, however, not to obstruct the view that these were relatively soon to be accompanied by a similarly quasi-religiously loaded cult surrounding prominent living revolutionaries, such as Friedrich Hecker etc. He, too outlived 1848, the year of revolution, by some decades and - bearing in mind the numerous Hecker "devotional souvenirs" in 1998 - right up until today.

**Heidi Hein**: Freiheitsheld und Symbolfigur: Der Pilsudski-Kult als Mittel nationaler Identitäts- und Bewusstseinsbildung, in zeitenblicke 3 (2004), Nr. 1.

The Pilsudski cult is a typical political cult defined by the components, myth, ritual and symbols as well as a consequent institutionalisation. Political cults are similar in the forms of expression and intermediation, whereas as regards content, reference must be made to respective traditions and the historical context.

Since the death cult around Pilsudski is based on a personality cult, this is outlined from the First World War until 1935, and then in the following the funeral depicted as the catalyst and start of the death cult, the death cult itself is depicted until 1939 and also forms of expression and functions of the cult until 1939. Subsequently there is an examination of its development during the Second World War, in the Pilsudski-related emigration, during the People's Republic of Poland and in the Third Republic. It is to be made clear that the Pilsudski cult had always been politically instrumentalised, whereby the myth as content component was nuanced every time. It received legitimatory and identity functions beyond the Second Republic and also influenced the historical memory.


Rumania's path to democracy after 1989 is one of violent revolution with a partial elitist continuity and deliberate repression. The consequent suffering that resulted for all political groups from the political culture of Rumania was ultimately reflected in the confrontation with the death of the dictator couple, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. This article discusses the premise that the open political dispute about the Ceausescu years and the December Revolution has only now begun, after a certain period of uneasiness. It describes the reasons for the violent overthrow and centres on the symbolic and discursive location of the 'stolen revolution'. Therefore, a 'dense description' reverting back to the concepts of
transformation research, generation sociology, classic revolutionary theory and the 'king's two bodies' model developed by Ernst Kantorowicz would seem fitting.


Remembrance or memories depend on the social organisation of their propagation and the media used for such. Therefore, the influence and impact the new computer-conveyed media have on remembrance cultures are very much on the agenda. The mnemonic relevance of the pictorial presentation of historical occurrences has been increasingly analysed in recent times; visualisation, in particular in electronic media, has been emphasised as the fundamental trend of an iconic publicity and (political) culture. The digitisation opens up a whole new dimension, which to date has mostly been discussed with regard to the technical basics and increased memory capacity of remembrance information. The dynamic, multimedia and interactive dimensions which can bring about a whole new quality in the staging and fictionalisation of historical events has as yet been somewhat neglected. The results achieved so far suggest that it will result in a market-like structure of remembrance cultures and that it has to be assumed that, from a financial point of view the (global) competitive situation will be in a framework of 'public-private-partnerships'.


The battle of Tannenberg/Grunwald of 15 July 1410 is one of the most important Polish national myths. This article deals with the 'Grunwald myth', which after 1870 gained in importance and became a popular subject of Polish painting and literature. The staging and function of the 500-year celebrations, which were held from 15 - 17 July 1910 in Krakow are discussed. 150,000 people took part in the celebrations, turning these into the greatest national manifestation of the divided Poland. The celebration itself became an occasion of remembrance and a point of reference for jubilees. In Germany, the victory over the Russian troops in Tannenberg in August 1914 was associated with the battle of 1410. The 1914 victory played a special role in the Hindenburg cult, and the national monument Tannenberg became the scene of grand German nationalistic and national socialist ceremonies. After 1945, the battle as such had no place in the German collective memory, the national myth in the People's Republic of Poland was, however, modified and used to integrate the new regime into the Polish national tradition and to reinforce the old enemy image of Germany and the friendship with the Soviet Union.


The 'Musée des Monuments Français' emanated in 1793 from the French Revolution. The former monastery which housed expropriated church goods, underwent a change under Alexandre Lenoir, becoming a chronologically ordered hall of fame of French history. Tombs and monuments remind us of various personalities of this history – from Héloïse through many kings, culminating in Descartes. However, the 'Musée des Monuments Français' was less a place of a royal death cult, rather a museum in which the royal tombs functioned as exhibits within the presentation of the French history. This therefore led to a polarisation among the contemporaries - followers and opponents. For instance, Michelet and Wilhelm von Humboldt were ardent admirers of the 'Musée des Monuments Français', whereas Chateaubriand strictly repudiated it.
In the 'Musée des Monuments Français' the tombs and sculptures bore permanent witness to the defeat of the kingdom. During the Restauration the museum was closed at the end of 1816 and the royal tombs returned to the church of Saint Denis.

**Helke Rausch:** Kultdissenz und umstrittene "Nation": Der Totenkult um die Kommunarden von 1871 in Paris aus vergleichender Perspektive, in zeitenblicke 3 (2004), Nr. 1.

The installation of a marble plaque on the 'Mur des Fédérés' in the Père Lachaise cemetery in Paris in 1908 in remembrance of the murdered Commune members of the 1871 insurgency put an end to a conflict-laden initiative of public death cult that had been around since the early 1880s. The advocates of the left raised the Commune to the echelons of a reference point for an emancipated, egalitarian nation. However, the governing 'opportunisme' distanced itself resolutely from this interpretation. Cause for conflict was still the ritual practice of remembrance at Père Lachaise in the form of political demonstrations of leftist groups, which, however, because of their heterogeneous structure hardly made their mark beyond a singular protest. Thus, the 'Mur des Fédérés' remained a controversial location of the death cult: for its advocates a symbol of a radical-socialist utopia; for its opponents a quasi memorial burden in the attempt to banish the Commune from the memory of the French nation. Unlike the unsuccessful attempts since 1880 to form a cult around the Berlin March victims, it was once again revealed that the politicised death cult could serve programmatically and ritually-symbolically as a vehicle for the concept of national historical image.

**Frank Renken:** Der Kampf um den 19. März: Zur gesellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung um das Totengedenken der Algerienkriegsveteranen in Frankreich, in zeitenblicke 3 (2004), Nr. 1.

This article deals with the development of the historical-political disputes about the 19 March, which the 'Fédération Nationale des Anciens Combattants en Algérie, Maroc, Tunisie' (FNACA), as the leading association of the French Algerian war veterans, declared as remembrance day for their fallen comrades from 1954 to 1962. As armistice day between the French colonial army and the Algerian national liberation movement FLN ('Front de Libération Nationale') the 19 March 1962 stands for peace in Algeria. An air of capitulation before the 'rebels' also surrounds this day, since it triggered off the process leading to Algeria's independence. The various governments of the Fifth Republic persistently refused to recognise the 19 March as a public holiday, because it was not a suitable date for the reconciliation of a nation torn apart by the Algerian war. Instead, the remembrance activities organised by the FNACA have, since the 1970s, been a regular target for polemic attacks from right-wing political camps who continue to defend the heritage of French colonialism in Algeria.

**Natalie Scholz:** "Quel spectacle" — Der Tod des Herzogs von Berry und seine melodramatische Bewältigung, in zeitenblicke 3 (2004), Nr. 1.

The assassination of Duc de Berry was a crucial test for the unstable balance of the French Restauration and turned the virulent political extremes into open conflict. However, Berry's death was one of the greatest media happenings of its time. Graphics, odes and newspaper articles illustrated melodramatically the death of the Duke. The thesis of this essay is that this emotionally-laden representation of the happening not only got in the way of the political struggles, but also unfurled an integrative potential, by letting the act of aggression against the monarchy retreat behind the feelings of the persons involved. The official representation of the monarchy was caught in the remembrance-political dilemma of having to commemorate the royal victim of revolutionary misdeeds, but at the same time having to
wipe out the memories of the assailability of the monarchy. On the other hand, how the media dealt with the assassination illustrated that there would have been other possibilities of monarchic self-presentation which could have pushed this dilemma into the background.

Winfried Speitkamp: Der Totenkult um die Kolonialheroen des Deutschen Kaiserreichs, in zeitenblicke 3 (2004), Nr. 1.

The death of the German colonial pioneers seemingly constituted an ideal field of national identity. These forerunners had taken possession of African territory against all inconveniences of nature and resistance of the indigenous population. The remembrance of the dead heroes was therefore fuel for obvious myths of national success. Taking the two most famous German colonial pioneers, Hermann von Wissmann and Carl Peters as an example, this article examines which form and function the death cult surrounding the colonial empire heroes had. Burial ceremonies, obituaries, memorials and aftermaths were contemplated before ultimate comparative, general conclusions were drawn. Here it was clear that the tribute paid to the colonial heroes only contributed at all events superficially to national integration. In fact the cult surrounding the colonial pioneers, which in the days of the Kaiser could be traced back to the colonial movement itself and was only backed with a certain reservation, was used more and more to criticise the Berlin policies, serving vindication and the assignment of guilt. The colonial revisionism initiated after 1918 confirmed these findings.


The national memory politics established in Prussia after the death of Queen Luise in 1810, holds several special features. The dead queen was no longer revered in the form of a monarchical death cult. She became the heroine in the narrative of the national liberation. The intellectual advocates of the concept of the people’s uprising saw in the early death of the queen a useful symbol to mobilise the people. However, the Luise cult and the victim rhetoric did not reach its zenith until the Empire (Kaiserreich) days. Only then did the Luise cult become a fixed part of the cultural memory. Luise became the female icon of the national movement. The endowment of the Luise medal or cross and the popularisation of Luise’s story in books contributed to the inclusion of women in the nation. The Luise cult is part of a political myth. Political myths are narrations and serve to give identity and mobilise a political group. They deploy their impact by using rituals and reducing the complex reality to simple interpretation and activity archetypes.